Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 2 [lead-zwing]
Baldwin, James Mark
Whewell,William. (1794-1866.) Studied, 
graduated, and became a fellow at Trinity 
College, Cambridge ; took orders in the 
Church of England ; professor of mineralogy 
at Trinity, 1828-32, of moral theology or 
casuistry, 1838-55; master of Trinity College 
after 1841; Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge 
University after 1855. 
Whole (and Parts) [AS. hal, healthy ; Gr. 
oAos, entire] : Ger. das Ganze ; Fr. le tout ; Ital. 
iltutto. The old definition is : ‘ Totum est quod 
constat plurium rerum unione.’ Psychologi¬ 
cally, whatever is treated as a single object 
though capable of treatment as two or more 
objects (parts of the whole): by ‘treated’ 
meaning ‘ thought of/ £ attended to/ or other¬ 
wise ‘ acted upon.’ (c.s.p.-j.m.b., g.f.s.) 
We may say that a whole is an ens rationis 
whose being consists in the copulate being of 
certain other things, either not entia rationis 
or not so much so as the whole ; so that 
a whole is analogous to a collection, which is, 
in fact, a special kind of whole. There can 
be no doubt that the word whole always 
brings before the mind the image of a collec¬ 
tion, and that we interpret the word whole 
by analogy with collection. The idea of a 
collection is itself, however, by no means an 
easy one to analyse. It is an ens rationis, 
abstraction, or fictitious subject (but the 
adjective must be understood in a broad sense, 
to be considered below), which is individual, 
and by means of which we are enabled to 
transform universal propositions into singular 
propositions. Thus, the proposition ‘ all men 
are mortal/ with a new subject and new 
predicate, appears as ‘ The collection of men 
is a collection of mortals’; just as, for other 
purposes, and by means of other abstractions, 
we transform the same proposition into ‘ The 
character of mortality is possessed by every 
man’; and the members of the collection are 
regarded as less fictitious than the collection. 
It very often happens that an object given in 
direct perception as an individual is, on closer 
scrutiny, seen to be identifiable with a collec¬ 
tion of parts. But it does not seem to be 
strictly accurate to say that the larger object 
of perception is identical with that abstrac¬ 
tion, the collection of the smaller objects. 
It is rather something perceived which agrees 
in its relations with the abstraction so well 
that, for convenience, it is regarded as the 
same thing. Ho doubt the parts of a per¬ 
ceived object are virtually objects of conscious¬ 
ness in the first precept ; but it is useless to 
try to extend logical relations to the sort of 
thought which antecedes the completion of 
the percept. By the time we conceive an 
object as a collection, we conceive that the 
first reality belongs to the members of the 
collection and that the collection itself is a 
mere intellectual aspect, or way of regarding 
these members, justified, in ordinary cases, 
by certain facts. We may, therefore, define 
a collection as a fictitious (thought) individual, 
whose being consists in the being of certain 
less fictitious individuals. 
Many adjectives are used to distinguish 
different kinds of wholes. Certain of the 
phrases may be defined. 
Actual whole : any whole which cannot 
exist without the existence of its parts. 
Usually identified with the Constitute whole. 
Monboddo’s definition {Ancient Met., i. 479) 
is not quite accurate. 
Collective whole, or aggregate whole : defined 
by Chauvin as ‘ that which has material parts 
separate and accidentally thrown together 
into one, as an army/ &c. But the example 
shows that organization does not disqualify 
a whole from being called collective, although 
the term totum per aggregationem will no 
longer be applied to it, in that case. In so 
far as a whole is collective, any other relation 
between its parts is put out of view. 
Composite whole : a term of Burgersdicius, 
who {Inst. Met., I. xxii. § 7) defines it as 
‘ quod ex duabus partibus constat quarum 
una est in potentia ad alterum et altera 
vice versa actus est alterius.’ It includes 
the whole by information and the whole by 
Comprehensive whole : a whole of logical 
Constituent whole : a whole which is essen¬ 
tial to its parts. See Universal. 
Constitute whole : a whole whose parts are 
essential to it. See Actual whole (above). 
Continuous whole', a continuum regarded 
as a whole. In order to define it, it would 
first be necessary to define Continuity (q. v.). 
Now we have, perhaps, not yet succeeded in 
analysing the conception of continuity; for 
what the mathematicians call by that name, 
such as the relations of all real quantities 
capable of being designated to an indefinite 
degree of approximation by means of a whole 
number and a decimal, does not answer the 
requisites of the problem. 
Copulative whole, a whole consisting of a 
sign which is essentially applicable to what¬ 
ever certain signs, called its parts, are all 
applicable, but is essentially inapplicable to 


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