Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Titel:
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 2 [lead-zwing]
Person:
Baldwin, James Mark
PURL:
https://digitalesammlungen.uni-weimar.de/viewer/image/lit29448/631/
SUBCONTRARY — SUBJECT 
the focus (attention). The Herbartian ‘mecha¬ 
nism of presentations’ (cf. Heebaetianism) 
did much to introduce the notions both of the 
unconscious and of the subconscious. 
The subconscious and ‘ unconscious ’ have 
been hypostatized to do many marvellous 
things ; art has been made the product of the 
subconscious, the genius has been endowed 
with a wonder-working ‘ subconscious ’ ; all of 
which means that certain mysteries of endow¬ 
ment are not open to introspective analysis— 
certainly to those of us who have them not— 
and because they are not spread out on the 
tablet of consciousness, the subconscious, it is 
held, plays the greater part. 
The terms ‘ semi- ’ and ‘ half-conscious ’ are 
loosely used for sub- or vEgue consciousness. 
(J.M.B.) 
Literature : Wabd, art. Psychology, 
Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), xx. 47b; Baldwin, 
Handb. of Psychol., i. (1890) 57 ; Külpe, 
Outlines of Psychol., 190, 291; Titcheneb, 
Exper. Psychol., i. 194; Primer of Psychol., 
256. See also Unconscious, and Bibliog. 
G, 2, c. (e.b.t.-j.m.b.) 
Subcontrary [Lat. sub + contra, against] : 
Ger. subconträr ; Fr. subcontraire ; Ital. sub- 
contrario. Two propositions having the same 
subject and the same predicate, if so related 
that they can both be true, but cannot both 
be false, are said to be subcontraries ; the rela¬ 
tion is called ‘subcontrary’ Opposition (q.v., 
with diagram). 
The ordinary doctrine is that ‘ Some S is P ’ 
and ‘ Some Sis not P’ are subcontraries. Thus, 
‘ Some phoenixes rise from their ashes,’ and 
‘ Some phoenixes do not rise from their ashes.’ 
But it is better to regard both as false when 
their subjects are non-existent. (c.s.p.) 
Subject (-ive) [Lat. sub, under, below, + 
iacëre, to throw] : Ger. Subjekt, subjektiv, Fr. 
sujet, subjectif ; Ital. soggetto, soggettivo. (1) 
The material or content of a thought or dis¬ 
course, as distinct from that with which the 
thought is concerned; or Object (q.v.), sub¬ 
ject-matter. 
(2) Hence, the substantive, the real. 
(3) That which is the source and centre of 
the process of thought, or, more widely, of all 
psychical processes—the self, ego, mind. In 
this latter connection subjective assumes two 
meanings : (a) that which is concerned with, 
or arises from, mental operations, as distin¬ 
guished from the objective as appertaining 
to the external and material world ; (b) that 
which is merely mental; the illusory; that 
which lacks validity ; that which is not 
universal, but confined to some one individual, 
and to him because of something accidental 
in his make-up. 
In aesthetics, subjective and objective are 
often opposed to one another as designating 
two types of criticism : the former, that into 
which the personality of the author enters; 
the latter, impersonal, impartial, and more or 
less cold. 
The term begins with a logical sense in 
Aristotle, which, however, as is usual in Greek 
thought, has an ontological meaning as well. 
Logically, it is the subject of a proposition, 
or of a discourse, that of which something is 
asserted, imoKeigevov. But Plato had distin¬ 
guished between ovoga as subject and prjga as 
predicate, the ovoga being the noun or sub¬ 
stantive, the constant as against the changing 
verb, which thus connotes ovala, essence 
(Theaet. 206, and Crat. 399). Aristotle even 
more explicitly identifies the subject with 
the substrate, the Substance (q. v.)—which, 
indeed, is only the Latin translation of his 
imoKeigevov. This, as indeterminate subject, 
is v\rj, matter; but as determinate, it is specific 
individual being, genera being only secondary 
subjects. It can be subject only, never pre¬ 
dicate (see Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 217 ff. ; 
Ueberweg, Logic, 143-4; Trendelenburg, Hist. 
Beitr., i. 13-34, and 54-6). According to the 
Stoics (Prantl, op. cit., i. 428-32 ; Trendelen¬ 
burg, op. cit., 221), the subject is one of the four 
fundamental categories, and designates being 
without quality, and, therefore, the ultimate 
subject of all judgment; the unqualified—the 
pure universal. As such it is the receptacle in 
which the formative or seminal reason works. 
Here we have a complete fusion of the 
logical and ontological senses. Apuleius and 
Capella (Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 581, 676) 
used the terms subdita and subjectiva as tech¬ 
nical terms for the subject of a proposition 
or judgment ; while Boethius for the first 
time (so Prantl, loc. cit., i. 696) makes use of 
the terms subjectivum and praedicatum. In 
this form the term passed into scholastic 
thought. As might be expected, we owe to 
a nominalist, Occam, the first exposition of 
the ambiguity of the term, and the distinction 
of its real form and its logical sense (ad existen- 
tiam, ad praedicationem, Prantl, loc. cit., iii. 
368). It is to Scotus that we owe the distinc¬ 
tion of subjective and objective in the sense 
which persisted practically till the time of 
Baumgarten and Kant. 
Scotus identified the two terms with the 
familiar distinction of Arabian thought of 
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