Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 2 [lead-zwing]
Baldwin, James Mark
Jena Universities in philology, jurisprudence, 
and philosophy. In Jena he heard Schelling, 
and later, in Berlin, Fichte. Owing chiefly 
to the influence of the latter he gave up the 
practical pursuits which had before occupied 
his attention, and in 1804 devoted himself to 
learning. He became Privatdocent in Berlin, 
and studied Spinoza as well as Fichte and 
Schelling; habilitated (1809) in Frankfurt 
a. d. Oder, and lectured in philology and 
philosophy. In 1811 he moved to Berlin as 
professor of philosophy. There he died. 
Solidarity (social) [Lat. solidus, firm] : 
Ger. Solidarität (cf. Sentiment, social); Fr. 
solidarité; Ital. solidarietà. The union of 
individuals in a social whole, together with 
the social sentiment which characterizes each 
of the individuals (see Barth, Philos, der 
Geschichte als Sociol., i. 27, with exposition of 
Comte’s view). Cf. Social Organization, 
Social Tissue, and Socius. (j.m.b., f.h.g.) 
Solidity : see Impenetrability, and 
Solipsism [Lat. solus, alone, + ipse, self] : 
Ger. Solipsismus ; Fr. solipsisme ; Ital. solip- 
sismo. Subjective Idealism (q. v.) as follows 
in (1) to (3): 
(1) As theory of knowledge: the doctrine 
that since knowing is a subjective process in 
the mind of an individual, what is known 
must always be either the self or some modi¬ 
fication of the self. Or, stated negatively, the 
doctrine that nothing can be known except 
the self and its modifications or states. 
(2) As metaphysics or theory of reality: 
the doctrine that nothing but the self exists. 
(3) Subjective idealism as metaphysics is 
often used to cover theories, like that of 
Berkeley, which deny the independent exis¬ 
tence of an external material world, although 
such theories do not usually deny that some 
reality in addition to the individual subject 
exists, and hence cannot be properly called 
(4) Kant uses the word as an ethical term 
{Werke, ed. Hartenstein, v. 77) in the sense 
of self-seeking, practical egoism, but this has 
not been followed by English writers. Cf. 
Self-love, ad fin. 
The argument for solipsism is thus stated 
by Bradley : ‘ I cannot transcend experience, 
and experience must be my experience. From 
this it follows that nothing beyond my self 
exists, for what is experience is its (the self’s) 
states ’ {Appearance and Reality, 248). 
If the attitude of solipsism is defined 
rigorously, it would be difficult to name 
historic representatives of the theory. It 
may, however, be taken as the limit towards 
which certain theories logically tend, if con¬ 
sistently pursued, and hence in the following, 
the tendencies coming under (3) above will 
be noted as well as the more rigorously 
defined solipsism. 
Speaking generally, modern philosophy 
from the time of Descartes, as contrasted 
with ancient philosophy, has found its starting- 
point in self-consciousness, and has viewed 
the existence of other reality than itself as 
a matter of inference rather than of immediate 
certainty. Ambiguities in the conception of 
the ‘ self ’ have led to a confusion of the 
position that all experience and all objects of 
experience must be within consciousness, and 
the metaphysical position, on the other hand, 
that the consciousness, or the ‘self’ just 
referred to, must be regarded as an exclusive 
subjective process. The subjective direction 
was given to modern philosophy by the 
position of Descartes, that knowledge of 
the self is the primary certainty, whereas the 
existence of God and of an external world 
may be doubted, until these are seen to be 
necessary grounds of certain ideas found 
within the self. This view, that the existence 
of all except the self and its ideas is a matter 
of doubt or inference rather than of im¬ 
mediate knowledge, is called by Kant ‘ pro¬ 
blematic idealism.’ Locke takes a similar 
attitude, maintaining that ‘since the mind 
hath no other immediate object but its own 
ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, 
it is evident that our knowledge is only con¬ 
versant about them ’ {Essay, IV. i. 1). He, 
however, holds that we have an ‘ intuitive 
knowledge of our own existence, a demonstra¬ 
tive knowledge of the existence of a God, 
a sensitive knowledge of some few other 
things.’ Metaphysically, Locke has no doubt 
of the existence of a world of things corre¬ 
sponding to our ideas—except as regards the 
secondary qualities of colour, sound, &c.—but 
he admits that its existence cannot be de¬ 
monstrated. Berkeley, agreeing with Locke 
that immediate knowledge is only of the self 
and its ideas, and that the existence of God 
is demonstrable, denies the existence of an 
independent material world, on the ground 
that to suppose such an existence would 
commit the absurdity either of supposing 
that conscious sensations or ideas could exist 
apart from consciousness, or of supposing that 
some entity, which is not itself an idea, 
could be like an idea. A similar position as 


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