SCHOLASTICISM
name of the period of mediaeval thought in
which philosophy was pursued under the
domination of theology, having for its aim
the exposition of Christian dogma in its
relations to reason. See History or Philo¬
sophy, and Latin and Scholastic Termino¬
logy.
(2) Any mode of thought characterized by
excessive refinement and subtlety; the making
of formal distinctions without end and without
special point.
Scholasticism is distinguished, on one
hand, from Arabian philosophy (see, however,
lower down) carried on outside the pale of
the Church ; and from Mysticism (q. v.), which
is found within the Church paralleling Scho¬
lasticism. The latter emphasizes logical and
formal processes ; as the former, feeling and
inner experience. Charlemagne founded
schools of learning all over Prance, which
was, thereafter, the special home of learning
and of science. The teachers were termed
doctor es scholastici (Ueberweg, Hist, of
Philos., i, according to whom the use of the
term may be traced hack to Theophrastus),
while the wandering scholar-teachers from
the mission schools of the Church were termed
scholastici (Erdmann, Hist, of Philos., i. 288).
They were ecclesiastics, so it is not a matter
of surprise that they philosophize wholly in
the interests of the Church. The language
is Latin. The method is comment upon and
exposition of selected passages of Scripture
and the early logicians, and finally of the
Church fathers and Aristotle. They com¬
bined with their strictly philosophic pursuits
all the science and culture of their age (in the
Trivium and Quadrivium). Cf. Patristic
Philosophy.
The schools were founded in the 8th
century, hut it is not till the 9th that
specifically philosophic thought appears.
While in one sense scholasticism still con¬
tinues as the official teaching of the Roman
Catholic Church, its dominance and its
independent career ceased with the Renais¬
sance and the 15th century. The intervening
five centuries are conveniently divided into
three sub-periods: (1) the formation of
scholasticism, formulation of its problems ;
(2) its systematization; (3) its decline. The
three periods may also be characterized by their
reference to antiquity. The first was based
upon fragments of Aristotle’s logical writings
and Neo-Platonic commentaries; the second is
due to systematic acquaintance with Aristotle;
the third to the humanistic revival of all
ancient learning, which, even when honouring
Aristotle, gave him a freer interpretation.
I. In the first period, Scotus Erigena
is in many respects nearer to the mystics
than to the scholastics proper, and is pan¬
theistic in his theology. He is influenced
chiefly by the Neo-Platonists rather than by
Aristotle. But in two respects he is ex¬
tremely important for scholasticism in the
narrower sense, (a) He asserts the essential
identity of the content of faith and reason,
and in the most immediate way. Any dictum
of authority is reasonable, and every rational
principle may be considered as dogma ; true
religion is true philosophy, and vice versa.
The problem thus raised of the relation
between the two is of determining importance
for the entire period. (b) He assumes a
complete parallelism of the hierarchy of
being on one side, and thought on the other,
proceeding from the most universal to the
most particular ; the former comprehends
and produces the latter. Creation is equiva¬
lent to the logical unfolding or making
explicit of the supreme universal, from God
down, in a graded scale of beings, to the
individual things of sense—the lowest form
of reality. This might be termed the deduc¬
tive process. On the other hand is the
eternal return to God—i. e. the logical in¬
clusion of the particulars again in the
universal, the inductive movement. This
involves, as aptplied to man, the theory of
redemption, immortality, &c. Now the signifi¬
cance of this is not only in its frankly stated
Realism (q. v., i), but in the use of this
realism to state and explain the fundamental
doctrines of the Church—those of creation,
the Trinity, sin, and redemption.
In this connection the discussion becomes
one of tremendous import—of the relation of
God as the universal to the individual, to
man. When separated from this relationship,
the whole realistic-nominalistic discussion
degenerates into formal subtleties and re¬
finements. It is Anselm who carries out in
a systematic and reflective way the philo¬
sophical statement of all the dogmas of the
Church, and who sees in realism the only
justification of the supi’eme authority of God,
of the doctrine of the Trinity, and asserts
that nominalism is only the deification of
sensible things. It also leads him to the
Ontological Argument (q. v.). Roscelin,
as a nominalist, had shown that its effect
on theology is to substitute a doctrine of
tritheism for the Trinity, while Berengar
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