Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Titel:
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 2 [lead-zwing]
Person:
Baldwin, James Mark
PURL:
https://digitalesammlungen.uni-weimar.de/viewer/image/lit29448/37/
LOGIC 
its central problem is the classification of 
arguments, so that all those that are bad are 
thrown into one division, and those which are 
good into another, these divisions being 
defined by marks recognizable even if it be 
not known whether the arguments are good 
or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide 
good arguments by recognizable marks into 
those which have different orders of validity, 
and has to afford means for measuring the 
strength of arguments. 
An approach to such a classification is made 
by every man whenever he reasons, in the proper 
sense of that term. It is true that the contem¬ 
plation of a state of things believed to be real 
may cause the contemplator to believe something 
additional, without making any classifica¬ 
tion of such sequences. But in that case he 
does not criticize the procedure, nor so much 
as distinctly reflect that it is just. He can, 
consequently, not exercise any control over it. 
Now, that which is uncontrollable is not 
subject to any normative laws at all ; that is, 
it is neither good nor bad; it neither sub¬ 
serves an end nor fails to do so. But it is 
only the deliberate adoption of a belief in 
consequence of the admitted truth of some 
other proposition which is, properly speaking, 
reasoning. In that case the belief is adopted 
because the reasoner conceives that the method 
by which it has been determined would either 
in no analogous case lead to a false conclusion 
from true premises, or, if steadily adhered to, 
would at length lead to an indefinite approxi¬ 
mation to the truth, or, at least, would assure 
the reasoner of ultimately attaining as close 
an approach to the truth as he can, in any 
way, be assured of attaining. In all reason¬ 
ing, therefore, there is a more or less conscious 
reference to a gênerai method, implying some 
commencement of such a classification of 
arguments as the logician attempts. Such 
a classification of arguments, antecedent to 
any systematic study of the subject, is called 
the reasoner’s logica utens, in contradistinction 
to the result of the scientific study, which is 
called logica docens. See Reasoning. 
That part of logic, that is, of logica docens, 
which, setting out with such assumptions as 
that every assertion is either true or false, 
and not both, and that some propositions 
may be recognized to be true, studies the 
constituent parts of arguments and pi-oduces 
a classification of arguments such as is above 
described, is often considered to embrace the 
whole of logic ; but a more correct designa¬ 
tion is Critic (Gr. KptTiKrj. According to 
Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle divided logic 
into three parts, of which one was nphç Kpiatv). 
This word, used by Plato (who divides all 
knowledge into epitactic and critic), was 
adopted into Latin by the Ramists, and into 
English by Hobbes and Locke. From the 
last it was taken into German by Kant, who 
always writes it Critik, the initial c being 
possibly a reminiscence of its English origin. 
At present it is written Kritik in German. 
Kant is emphatic in the expression of the wish 
that the word may not be confounded with 
critique, a critical essay (Ger. Kritik). [The 
forms Critique and Critic are used interchange¬ 
ably in this work. (Cf. Criticism.) (j.m.b.)] 
It is generally admitted that there is a 
doctrine which properly antecedes what we 
have called critic. It considers, for example, 
in what sense and how there can be any true 
proposition and false proposition, and what 
are the general conditions to which thought or 
signs of any kind must confonn in order to 
assert anything. Kant, who first raised these 
questions to prominence, called this doctrine 
transcendentale Elementarlehre, and made it 
a large part of his Critic of the Pure Reason. 
But the Grammatica Speculativa of Scotus is 
an earlier and interesting attempt. The com¬ 
mon German word is Erkenntnisstheorie, 
sometimes translated Epistemology (q. v.). 
It is further generally recognized that 
another doctrine follows after critic, and which 
belongs to, or is closely connected with, logic. 
Precisely what this should contain is not 
agreed ; but it must contain the general con¬ 
ditions requisite for the attainment of truth. 
Since it may be held to contain more, one 
hesitates to call it heuristic. It is often called 
Method; but as thisword is also used in thecon- 
crete, methodic or methodeutic would be better. 
For deciding what is good logic and what 
bad, appeal is made by different writers to 
one or more, generally several, of these eight 
sources : to direct dicta of consciousness, to 
psychology, to the usages of language, to 
metaphysical philosophy, to history, to every¬ 
day observation, to mathematics, and to some 
process of dialectic. In the middle ages 
appeal was frequently made to authority. 
The appeal to direct consciousness consists 
in pronouncing certain reasoning to be good 
or bad because it is felt to be so. This is 
a very common method. Sigwart, for example, 
bases all logic upon our invincible mental 
repulsion against contradiction, or, as he calls 
it, ‘the immediate feeling of necessity' {Logic, 
§ 3, 2). Those who think it worth while to 
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