Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Titel:
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 2 [lead-zwing]
Person:
Baldwin, James Mark
PURL:
https://digitalesammlungen.uni-weimar.de/viewer/image/lit29448/306/
PERSONALITY 
contents, and then the broad question of 
recognition in general arises with the require¬ 
ment that the sense of personal sameness or 
identity be considered a case of this broader 
phenomenon. Whether this procedure shows 
that personal identity is a derived or genetic 
product, would seem to depend on the result 
of the analysis of recognition : that is, on 
whether recognition depends exclusively upon 
objective factors, or whether there is a subjective 
or £ self-recognition ’ aspect in all recognition. 
Even if the result be to show that there is an 
irreducible element of self-value in all recog¬ 
nition, the further question would still arise, 
as to whether this element is not, after all, 
a matter of the presentation of the object-self, 
and thus a matter of presentative construction 
—not, after all, an irreducible character of the 
subject-self. This question arises in regard 
to the continuous interest which, as is said 
below, has a leading part in the constituting 
of individual identity (cf. also what is said of 
the ‘ subjective or dispositional ’ aspect under 
Recognition). All such expressions, there¬ 
fore, as ‘ direct knowledge ’ of the sameness of 
self, immediate ‘ récognitive memory ’ of self, 
‘ intuition ’ of self as being the same, &c., have 
no value in lieu of thorough analysis of the 
general fact and process of recognition. 
(j.M.B.-G.E.S.) 
Indicating a more positive view, we may 
apply what is said of the cognition of indi¬ 
vidual Identity (q. v.), of which this is a special 
case. I am aware of myself as one being, be¬ 
cause my self has for me unity of interest and 
exclusiveness of interest. But there exists a 
complication in the case of personal identity 
which does not exist in the case of other 
individuals. I only come to be, in the fullest 
sense, one person by being aware that I am 
one person. The consciousness of unity is 
itself an integral part of the unity of which 
I am conscious. The unity of self-conscious¬ 
ness is the crown and completion of the unity 
of consciousness. But the unity of conscious¬ 
ness as expressed in the word ‘ I ’ cannot 
wholly consist in recognition of this unity. 
Otherwise we should be involved in a circle. 
The unity must already exist in some manner 
and degree before it can be cognized. How 
then is this primary unity constituted 1 The 
answer is only to be found if we consider the 
essential correlation of knowing and willing 
consciousness with objects known and willed. 
Subjective process is identical with itself 
throughout its changing phases if and so far 
as it is throughout concerned with objects 
recognizably the same. The seeking con¬ 
sciousness is one with the finding conscious¬ 
ness, because what is found is identified 
with what was sought. My unity as one in¬ 
dividual person is essentially correlated with 
the unity of my world as known and willed. 
And just as the world of knowledge and will 
possesses different degrees of unity for different 
individuals and different levels of mental 
development, so personal identity admits of 
very varying grades of completeness. It can 
scarcely be said to exist in lower animals : it 
is more imperfect in the child than in the adult, 
and in the savage than in the civilized mind. 
The philosophical problem involved in 
personal identity or individuality, on the other 
hand, is that of the value and meaning of the 
category. On the psychophysical side, the theory 
is prevalent that personal identity represents in 
some way the more permanent organization in 
the brain which stands for conscious person¬ 
ality, together with the neurological process 
underlying recognition. As to the latter, the 
hypotheses which make it respectively a 
sensory and a motor phenomenon are cited 
under Recognition. 
The requirement of analysis is enforced by 
pathological alterations and less grave illusions. 
Cf. Personality (disorders of). The com¬ 
plexity of the problem is further illustrated 
from the opinion of some that in the early 
and more unreflective stages of personal self¬ 
sense the bodily person is included in the 
content taken for self. 
Literature: Locke, Essay on the Human 
Understanding, Bk. II. chap, xxvii ; Hume, 
Treatise on Human Nature, Pt. IY. § 3 ; 
references given under Self, notably to Her- 
bart, Lotze, Bradley, and under Recog¬ 
nition. (G.F.S.—j.m.b.) 
Personality : see Person. 
Personality (disorders of): Ger. Persön¬ 
lichkeitsstörungen ; Fr. alterations (or troubles) 
delà personnalité ; Ital. (malattie della) persona- 
lità. Disorders of personality involve more 
or less disorganization of the memory con¬ 
tinuum, and of the group of elements which 
enter into the normal consciousness of personal 
identity. (j.j.-j.m.b.) 
The analysis of the physiological and psy¬ 
chological basis of personality naturally con¬ 
ditions the exposition of its disorders. A 
survey of typical cases of altered personality 
is in itself valuable, and contributes to a clearer 
understanding of its normal basis. Minor 
alterations appear in connection with many 
nervous and mental disorders involving changes 
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