Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 1 [a-laws]
Baldwin, James Mark
or “biophores”—contend with one another, 
and those that succeed best in securing food 
and place grow and multiply rapidly, and so 
displace those that are less suitably equipped.’ 
Weismann subsequently suggested the phrase 
‘ histonal selection ’ for this process, and finally 
reached the hypothesis of struggle between 
the germinal elements. He speaks of the three 
principal stages of selection as (i) Individual 
(Ger. Personal-) Selection (Darwin and Wal¬ 
lace); (2) Histonal Selection (Roux) ; and (3) 
Germinal Selection (Weismann). See those 
topics ; also Selection, and Existence 
(struggle for). The particular case of the 
selection of alternative functions, such as 
movements, has been called Functional Selec¬ 
tion (see Excess). 
Literature : Herbert Spencer, The Social 
Organism, Westminster Rev. (i860); W. 
Roux, Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus 
(1881); A. Weismann, Effect of External In¬ 
fluences upon Development, Romanes Lecture 
(1894), and Germinal Selection, Monist (1895); 
Delage, La Structure du Protoplasma, &c. ; 
Baldwin, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the 
Race (2nd ed.), chap. vii. (c.ll.m.) 
Intrinsic (1) and (2) Extrinsic [Lat. 
in- and extrinsecus\ : Ger. innerlich (or wesent¬ 
lich) and äusserlich ; Fr. in- and extrinsèque ; 
It al. in- and estrinseco. (1) Necessarily, and 
(2) not necessarily, belonging to a thing or 
object of thought. (j.m.b.) 
Intrinsic Value : Ger. innerer Werth ; 
Fr. valeur intrinsèque; Ital. valore intrinseco. 
Worth (q.v.) which belongs to an object or 
action in itself and is not due to its tendency 
to lead to some other object, or to promote 
a result. (w.R.s.) 
Introjection [Lat. intro, within, + iacere, 
to throw] : Ger. Introjection ; Er. introjec¬ 
tion ; Ital. introjezione. The name given by 
Richard Avenarius to a certain theory, which 
he considers fallacious, of the relation between 
the cognitive consciousness of the individual 
and the external world cognized by it. This 
theory rests upon two assumptions: (1) that 
the individual consciousness is locally enclosed 
within the individual organism; (2) that its 
presentations of external things are merely 
internal images or copies of these things, 
taken to be so by reason of the process 
described below. 
‘ Introjection ’ is closely akin to that 1 ideal 
philosophy’ which Reid ascribes to his pre¬ 
decessors, and in particular to Descartes, 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. There is no 
doubt that Reid was largely right in his 
account of the position of these philosophers. 
In the case of Descartes, we may refer to his 
theory of * ideas ’ in the corporeal phantasy to 
which the mind directly applies itself, and 
which intervene between it and external 
things. Indeed, the whole of the Cartesian 
philosophy is dominated by the antithesis 
between ‘ ideas ’ as objects that lie exclusively 
within subjective consciousness, constituting 
its private property, and the world outside 
which these ideas are supposed to resemble 
or to which they correspond. Further, it is 
clear that Descartes is apt to confuse exis¬ 
tence within the individual consciousness with 
existence within the individual organism. The 
soul is for him situated within the pineal 
gland, and it cannot directly cognize material 
objects unless they are in local proximity to 
it. As for Locke, we may refer to a passage 
quoted by Reid : ‘ Methinks the understand¬ 
ing is not much unlike a closet wholly shut 
from light, with only some little opening left 
to let in external visible resemblances or 
ideas of things without. Would the picture 
coming into such a dark room but stay there, 
and lie so orderly as to be found upon occa¬ 
sion, it would very much resemble the under¬ 
standing of a man in reference to all objects 
of sight and the ideas of them.’ The same 
kind of assumption is illustrated by Hamil¬ 
ton’s theory that the primary qualities are 
perceived as ‘ in our organism,’ and by his 
doctrine of sense-perception throughout (his 
ed. of Reid, ii. 881). 
Avenarius describes and analyses this point 
of view with great precision, and he shows 
that it must emerge naturally and necessarily 
at a certain stage of mental growth. This 
feature of his theory has been considered especi¬ 
ally original, and it is this to which many of 
the expositions of introjection as a process 
have been confined. He also shows the essen¬ 
tial fallacy involved in it, and traces the 
disastrous consequences of this fallacy in 
philosophy and psychology. But Avenarius 
was anticipated, on the psychological side at 
least, by Herbart. Herbart, in his account of 
the growth of self-consciousness, traces the 
emergence of a point of view essentially the 
same as that which Avenarius calls introjec¬ 
tion. ‘ The child at a certain stage comes to 
distinguish between those living things which 
contain within them representations of things 
external to them and those which do not.’ 
This point of view is crude, but it constitutes 
an essential step in the development of the 
consciousness of self. The mode in which it 


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