Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 1 [a-laws]
Baldwin, James Mark
I and Me. Synonymous with subject-self 
and object-self. See Self (also for foreign 
equivalents). (j.m.b.) 
I (in logic). Symbol for the particular 
affirmative judgment: ‘Some men are fools.’ 
Cf. A (in logic). (j.m.b.) 
Iamblicus (or Jamblicus). Lived in the 
3rd and 4th century a.d. A Neo-Platonic 
philosopher, who was a disciple of Porphyry. 
Many of his writings are extant. See Alex- 
andkian School. 
Iconolatry : see Image-wokship. 
Id : see Idant, and Biophoee. 
Idant [no specific formation according 
to Weismann—e.b.p.] (the same in other 
languages). The hypothetical unit resulting 
from the aggregation of biophores, deter¬ 
minants, and ids (all Weismann’s terms). 
Suggested by Weismann, 1891 (Germ- 
Plasm, Eng. trans., 1893). (c.Ll.m.) 
Idea [Gr. Idea] : Ger. Idee, Vorstellung 
(presentation) ; Fr. idee ; Ital. idea, rapjpresen- 
tazione. The reproduction, with a more or 
less adequate Image (q. v.), of an object not 
actually present to the senses, (g.f.s.-j.m.b.) 
The partial reproduction by the image is 
distinguished fromactual perception by various 
alleged characteristics—on which, however, 
authorities differ—such as difference in degree 
of intensity and, perhaps, in kind of intensity, 
comparative absence of detail, comparative 
independence of bodily movement on the part 
of the subject, and comparative dependence 
on mental activity. 
The earlier English usage is well exempli¬ 
fied by the following passage from Locke: 
‘ I must at the entrance beg pardon for the 
frequent use of the word idea which he [the 
reader] will find in the following treatise ; it 
being that term which I think best to stand 
for whatever is the object of the understand¬ 
ing when a man thinks. I have used it to 
express whatever is meant by phantasm, 
notion, species, or whatever it is which the 
mind can be employed about in thinking ; 
and I could not avoid frequently using it’ 
(jEssay on Human Understanding, I. vi. § 8). 
In this passage the term is applied to objects 
apprehended, and not to the subjective state 
or process of apprehending them. Further, 
objects as perceived by means of actual sensa¬ 
tions are included under the term, as well as 
objects represented independently of actual 
sensations. In Hume the subjective process 
of apprehension is simply confused with the 
object as apprehended ; but he makes a sharp 
distinction between perceptual experiences, 
which he calls impressions, and ideas, which 
are, according to him, always fainter re¬ 
productions of previous impressional ex¬ 
The German Vorstellung is not uncommonly 
used so as to cover both perception and idea 
in the narrower sense (cf. Pkesentation). 
There has been a tendency to give the term 
‘ idea’ the same wide application in English. 
It is, for instance, so used in Titchener’s Outline 
of Psychology. But the English tradition since 
Hume is against this usage, and there seems 
to be no good reason for adopting it. The 
definition either of percept or idea, or both, as 
a group of sensations or sensory elements, so- 
called ‘ centrally initiated sensations ’ (see 
Sensation), implies a particular psycho¬ 
logical theory. The definition we have given 
might he provisionally adopted by all psycho¬ 
Literature: Locke, loc. cit.; Hume, Treatise


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