HEGEL’S TEKMINOLOGY 
was first expressed as Sein, and then as 
Wesen, is now to he fulfilled as Begriff. That 
alone can be real which is of the nature of 
the life, principle, or meaning that determines 
the whole process of Denken. So much, then, 
for the terms Denken, Gedanke, and Begriff. 
e. The way in which Negativität appears as 
the character of the Begriff is next notable. 
The Begriff, as the principle which determines 
both thought and things, is to be not only 
a self-related and self-differentiating process, 
but a process whose differentiations have 
exactly the type observable in self-conscious¬ 
ness of all grades. Self-consciousness, as Hegel 
is never weary of telling us, is a unity, at 
first immediate or abstract. This unity, how¬ 
ever, preserves itself just by exercising itself 
in overcoming, and reducing to the service of 
its own desire, or will, or conception, or in¬ 
sight, countless facts that at first view are 
foreign to its own nature. It thus involves 
mediation, with constant rewinning of imme¬ 
diacy. That is how any man lives, whether 
materially or spiritually. The logical account 
of the Begriff will have therefore first to 
state the universal dynamics of this self- 
conscious process in the most universal form. 
Hegel here calls the first, or immediate, aspect 
of the Begriff, its abstract universality {ab¬ 
strakte Allgemeinheit). Its mediation through 
variety of life, will, experience, meanings, finite 
individuals, &c., he calls in general its Sich- 
Bestimmung or its Besonderheit, its j)articu- 
larity. The developed Begriff, in differentiating 
itself into a variety of Bestimmungen, which, 
while held within the developing universal, 
may still in their immediacy seem at first 
foreign to its one meaning, ‘ comes to itself ’ 
precisely so far as, with concrete Allgemeinheit 
(or concrete universality), it recognizes these 
particulars as within itself, and as even in 
their immediacy still its own meaning. The 
finite facts of the life of the Begriff, the 
individuals of finite experience, the various 
Existenzen, &c., are thus within the concrete 
universcd of the whole life of the true Begriff. 
The three terms, universal, particular, and 
singular (or individual), like the original 
terms unmittelbar and vermittelt, may fre¬ 
quently change places in their application; 
but throughout their discussion the main 
conception remains, as just stated, constant. 
The process present is the one originally 
called Negativität, but now it is present as 
a conscious process. It is a process of asserting 
unity through self-differentiation, and through 
bringing the results again into organic rela¬ 
tions. The outcome of the process is a unity, 
essentially the unity of Self-Consciousness, 
wherein all finite individuality is present 
within a union {Einheit) of A llgemeinheit and 
Besonderheit (‘ The one undivided soul of many 
a soul ’ of Shelley’s familiar phrase). Hegel, 
in general, defines this union as the category 
of Einzelnheit, or individuality, the category, 
one might say, of the unity of the many in 
the one. 
These three, the categories of the Begriff, 
viz. Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit, and Einzeln¬ 
heit, are to be understood, like the rest of the 
discussion, with reference to the special nature 
of Hegel’s own Begriff. They are then not 
the merely tradition conceptions known under 
these names. In the later developments of 
this division of the Logic, the concrete uni¬ 
versal becomes explicitly identical with an 
infinite individual (in Hegel’s technical sense 
of infinite as developed above in (7), viz. 
a completely self-determined individual). 
f. The particular mediations of the Begriff, 
in its primary or more subjective forms, occur 
through the development of the doctrines of 
Urtheil and Schluss. These, the principal 
sections of the traditional Logic, are incorpo¬ 
rated by Hegel into his own theory in a 
greatly altered form, and with a deliberate 
effort to give them an interpretation which 
may also be stated as an objective process. 
An Urtheil is a process of making differentia¬ 
tion and the opposition of related terms ex¬ 
plicit. No judgment, therefore, is subjectively 
evpressive of a whole truth, and no corre¬ 
sponding objective process is a final one. 
Every judgment is one-sided, is a particular 
expression of Negativität, and passes away 
into some higher form of judgment, or into 
that truer expression of the Begriff, the Schluss. 
In particular, judgment depends upon opposing 
finite individuals, particulars and universals, 
in various degrees of abstraction, one to an¬ 
other, and then endeavouring to hold their 
unity also abstractly before the mind, despite 
the opposition. The higher forms of judgment 
express more nearly the organic union of 
finite individuals or particulars in inclusive 
universal wholes; but no judgment can reach 
the final unity, and the truth of the judgment 
is the Schluss. The Schluss is, as subjective 
process, an effort to express the uniting prin¬ 
ciple or Mitte {middle term), namely, the 
very selfhood of truth itself, which binds the 
many particulars of a differentiated experience 
in the unity of a single conscious whole. The 
objective correspondent of the subjective pro-: 
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