Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Titel:
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 1 [a-laws]
Person:
Baldwin, James Mark
PURL:
https://digitalesammlungen.uni-weimar.de/viewer/image/lit29445/492/
HEGEL’S TERMINOLOGY 
Bestimmtheit, or contrast with other beings. 
Dasein would be possessed, so far, by any 
object with characters, e. g. a house, or any 
part of the universe, viewed merely as distin¬ 
guishable part, but also by a rainbow, a flash 
of lightning, a taste or smell, or any Etwas. 
But such an Etwas is primarily bestimmt, its 
Dasein involves its determination. Only the 
precisely determinable, then, is present in 
the world of Dasein. If one says that he ex¬ 
periences something, we naturally ask, What ? 
If there is no answer naming the determina¬ 
tions of the Etwas in question, we have to say 
that it is nothing in particular, and this 
indefiniteness, if complete, would send us back 
to reines Sein, which is again equal to Nichts. 
But now, as Spinoza affirmed, omnis deter¬ 
minate est negatio, and so determination, or 
Bestimmtheit, implies contrast with, and so 
negation of, some other determinate character, 
and every Etwas is opposed to ein Anderes, its 
negation or other (as light is contrasted with 
darkness, &c.). Such contrast, as a universal 
feature of Dasein, includes the twofold 
character that every Etwas is positive, in so 
far as it is what it is, and negative, in so far 
as it excludes the other. The positive 
character, whereby light, for instance, is light, 
as opposed to the negative character, whereby 
light is not darkness, Hegel calls the Realität 
of any Etwas, as opposed to its Negation. So 
that the term Realität is used, in the sense of 
the Kantian table of categories (see Kant’s 
Terminology), to mean the positive aspect of 
the Bestimmtheit or differentia of any deter¬ 
minate being whatever (cf. Encyk., Werke, 
vi. 180; Logik, Werke, iii. 109 ff.). The 
difference between this usage and either the 
scholastic usage or the senses of reality more 
common in recent discussion must be noted. 
b. Existenz, as opposed to Sein, Dasein, and 
Realität, is a much higher category, and, al¬ 
though it expresses a later form of immediacy, 
belongs to the world of Wesen, i. e. of explicitly 
mediated or relative being, to the world of 
principles and of phenomenal expressions of 
principles. The typical case of Existenz is 
any physical thing, with qualities. This has 
a grade of being, not merely involving, like 
Dasein, or like colours and rainbows, con¬ 
trasts with other beings of the same grade, 
but pointing back to explanations, through 
principles, of the basis (Grund) upon which 
the thing’s existence depends, or which it 
manifests, even in its immediacy. What has 
Existenz is also in interaction with its en¬ 
vironment. 
Wirklichkeit is a still higher category. 
What has Existenz is a relatively immediate 
fact, but appears as the result of conditions, 
and as related to an environment. But 
what has Wirklichkeit not only has a basis, 
or is explicitly the expression of a principle, 
but contains this basis within itself, so that 
it is relatively (in the complete case wholly) 
independent of any environment. It is, then, 
a higher instance both of Fiirsichsein and 
of An-und-fiirsichsein. If a physical thing 
with qualities has Existenz, an organism, a 
commonwealth, a solar system, or any such 
relative totality (Totalität), possesses Wirk¬ 
lichkeit. In the most genuine sense, only the 
absolute would be wirklich, but the term is 
often employed for finite but relatively 
organic beings (Logik, Werke, iv. 113, 115 ff., 
120, 176 f., 178; Encyk., Werke, iv. 250, 
253, 282 ff. ; and cf. the introd. to the Encyk., 
iv. 10). 
The type of Wirklichkeit historically repre¬ 
sented by Spinoza’s substance possesses, for 
Hegel, the grade of being which he names 
Substantialität, namely, Wirklichkeit conceived 
as a fully developed necessary nature of 
things. 
c. Objektivität is the grade of being possessed 
by an object which explicitly fulfils or ex¬ 
presses a system of rational ideas, thoughts, 
or laws that is also subjectively conceived. 
This category differs from Wirklichkeit chiefly 
by virtue of the more explicit prior sundering 
of the ideal aspect of the world from its 
immediate aspect. To say that a thing is 
wirklich implies, indeed, that it expresses 
what can be defined as a law or rational 
character ; but one may first accept the 
Wirklichkeit as an immediate fact, and then 
observe its constitution, as a student of 
politics first regards the state as an actuality, 
and then analyses its structure. But when 
one affirms Objektivität, one does so after 
defining laws, subjective principles, systems 
of rational interrelationships, which already 
have their inner or a priori validity and 
necessity. 
When one asserts of these systems that they 
also possess the immediacy exemplified, on 
lower stages, by Dasein, Existenz, &c., then, 
and not till then, is one dealing with the 
grade of being defined as Objektivität. The 
systems of things subject to law or expressive 
of purpose, which we find in nature and in 
history, possess therefore not only Wirklich¬ 
keit, but also Objektivität ; as, for instance, one 
may say : ‘ Purpose is an objective fact in the 
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