Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Titel:
Dictionary of philosophy and psychology including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logics, aesthetics ... and giving a terminology in English, French, German and Italian, vol. 1 [a-laws]
Person:
Baldwin, James Mark
PURL:
https://digitalesammlungen.uni-weimar.de/viewer/image/lit29445/38/
ACTUALITY — ADAPTATION 
activity-experience exists other than sensations 
of motor strain and the like. Our definition 
leaves that question unanswered, and relates 
to activity considered as a form of process and 
not as a peculiar experience. The older con¬ 
ception of active process is well expressed by 
Locke {Essay on Human Understanding, 
Bk. II. chap. xxi. § 72) : ‘ The active power of 
motion is in no substance which cannot begin 
motion in itself, or in another substance, when 
at rest. So likewise in thinking, a power to 
receive ideas or thoughts, from the operation 
of any external substance, is called a power of 
thinking : but this is but a passive power or 
capacity. But to he able to bring into view 
ideas out of sight at one’s own choice, and to 
compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an 
active power.’ We have generalized this view 
so as to include all direction toward a terminus 
as well as explicit choice. Older psycho¬ 
logists often draw a sharp line of distinction 
between active processes and passive processes. 
Some limit activity to practical activity, and 
regard the cognitive side of our nature as 
purely passive. Beid, e. g., distinguishes be¬ 
tween intellectual and Active Powers (q. v.). 
The modern tendency is to regard the distinc¬ 
tion as one of degree rather than of kind, 
the element of conation being in some measure 
present in both. In recent times there has 
been much discussion concerning the nature 
and even the existence of mental activity. 
Ward regards it as a simple and ultimate 
datum of consciousness. According to him it 
is essential to all consciousness, and no account 
of it can be adequate which does not empha¬ 
size the concept of efficiency. The notion of 
causal efficiency in general is ultimately derived 
from mental activity. Wundt speaks of an ‘ im¬ 
mediate feeling of activity’ {Thätigkeitsgefülil). 
Bradley, on the other hand, regards the expe¬ 
rience of activity as a comparatively late and 
complex product of mental development. It 
is difficult to say whether he regards in the 
same way activity itself in distinction from the 
experience of it. Shadworth Hodgson entirely 
denies validity to the conception of mental 
activity. Activity-experiences are, according 
to him, indications of the existence of an 
activity which is not mental, but neural. We 
have tried to evade these debated questions by 
defining activity as a certain form of process 
which appears certainly to exist, whatever we 
may think of its origin and implications. The 
limiting cases would seem to be (1) so-called 
‘ anoetic ’ or ‘ passive ’ consciousness, in which 
the whole question of ‘ conscious process,’ as 
a narrower term than ‘ conscious experience,’ 
would be in debate, and (2) cases of non¬ 
voluntary process, of such an automatic or 
habitual kind that the concept of terminus loses 
its application. 
Literature’. James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 296- 
305 ; Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen 
Psychologie, Syst. d. Philos.; Rehmke, Allg. 
Psychol., 348-425; Bradley, Appearance 
and Reality (2nd ed.), 96-100, 603-7 ; Mind, 
O.S., 43, 47 ; Höeeding, Wiedererkennen, 
Association und psychische Activität, Vtljsch. 
f.wiss. Philos., xiv.; Ward, Mind, O.S.; Stout, 
Analytic Psychol., i. Bk. II. chap, i ; Baldwin, 
Handb. of Psychol., Senses and Intellect, 64, 
69, and Psychol. Rev., i. 6. (g.f.s.-j.m.b.) 
Actuality and Actual [Lat. actus] : Ger. 
Actualität, Wirklichkeit ; Fr. actualité ; Ital. 
attualità ed attuale. That which is in phe¬ 
nomenal reality or fact is actual, and is said 
to have actuality. The terms are opposed to 
Potential, and Potentiality (q.v.). See 
also Real and Actual, and Hegelian 
Terminology, YI. (j.m.b.) 
Actuality Theory. The theory that all ex¬ 
istence is activity ; opposed to substantiality. 
In psychology it makes the essence of the 
mental life entirely activity or process. For 
further discussion and literature, see Sub¬ 
stantiality. (j.m.b.) 
Actus (purus, and in other phrases) : 
see Activity, and Latin and Scholastic 
Terminology (glossary). 
Adam [Heb. Adam, human beings (Gen. i) ; 
personal name of the first man (Gen. ii) ; 
probably connected with Assyrian addmu, 
to build, form]. Adam occupies an important 
place in that section of doctrinal theology 
which treats of man in his actual and ideal 
relations to God. Here the dogmas of the 
Fall and of the Imputation of Adam’s Guilt 
may be regarded as principal sources of sin. 
In connection with this arises the dogma of 
the means of deliverance from God’s wrath 
and its penalty—of a universal condemna¬ 
tion to eternal perdition. This dogma con¬ 
stitutes the objective aspect of God’s relation 
to man in connection with reconciliation, just 
as ‘ conversion ’ constitutes the subjective. 
Literature’. Edwards, Works, ii. 303 f. ; 
J. Müller, Origin of Sin ; Kahnis, Dog¬ 
matik, ii. 107 f. ; Van Oosterzee, Christian 
Dogmatics, 466 f., 628 f. ; O. Peleideber, 
Philos, of Religion, iv. 10 f. (r.m.w.) 
Adaptation [Lat. adaptare] : Ger. Anpass¬ 
ung ; Fr. adaptation ; Ital. adattamento. (1) A 
word signifying adjustment or fitness ; as of 
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