CERTITUDE — CHANGE 
be such that it must be asserted by all intelli¬ 
gences, i. e. when its truth is taken to be 
assured by universally valid grounds. Logical 
certainty thus names only the representa¬ 
tion of the universal or common character 
of certainty, that which does not depend on 
the special kind of content involved. 
Historically, the problem may be said to 
begin in those discussions which preceded 
Aristotle’s definite statement of the distinction 
between mediate and immediate truths (see 
Anal. Post., i). From that time onwards the 
problem has been (x) to determine the nature 
of the assumed immediate truths in such 
a manner as to make the objective value 
claimed for them conceivable; (2) to clear 
up the relation in which mediate stands to 
immediate truth, and therewith, it may be 
said, to determine the worth of the highly 
metaphorical relation in which they are 
generally assumed to stand. 
Literature: Javary,Dc laCertitude (1847); 
Grung, Das Problem der Gewissheit (1886); 
Milhaud, Certitude Logique (2nded., 1898), 
and Le Rationnel (1897). (r.a.) 
Certitude or Certainty (psychological) 
[Lat. certitudo, from certus, certain] : Ger. 
Gewissheit; Fr. certitude) Ital.certezza. The 
degree of assurance felt with reference to 
something presented to the mind. 
This term is employed to express degrees 
of (1) conviction or belief. It is then applied 
to all cases from the slight tendency to accept 
a proposition or fact (characterized by the 
transition from the phrases ‘ I think,’ ‘ I 
fancy,’ to ‘ I presume,’ ‘ I begin to be con¬ 
vinced ’) up to so-called £ complete certitude,’ 
or knowledge. Certain authorities limit cer¬ 
titude to the highest degrees of assurance, 
where the possibility of doubt is excluded (e. g. 
Newman, Grammar of Assent). It also 
applies (2) to degrees of reality-feeling or 
‘ realizing-sense,’ in cases which do not in¬ 
volve argument, doubt, or explicit belief in 
any sort of assertion. 
Like other terms of epistemological value, 
certitude is often carried over from the mind 
to its object and made a property of the latter ; 
we say a proposition has certitude. In logic 
this is legitimate as a shorthand way of saying 
that a proposition is fitted to arouse certitude, 
or has a certain degree of Probability (q.v.). 
Literature: see Belief, and Certainty 
(logical). (j.m.b.-g.f.s.) 
Kettenschluss ; Fr. sorite; Ital. sorite. Ger¬ 
man logicians have named by cognate terms 
two forms of compound syllogism: (1) that 
in which the final syllogism has for its pre¬ 
mises the conclusions of preceding syllo¬ 
gisms, Schlusskette, when the former is 
called Epi-syllogism, the latter Pro-syllo¬ 
gism ; (2) when the conclusion is drawn 
from a series of more than two premises, 
Sorites (q.v.) or Kettenschluss. 
Literature : Ueberweg, Logik, §§ 124-5. 
(R.A.) 
Chalybäus, Heinrich Moritz. (1796- 
1862.) A German philosopher, born and died 
in Saxony. In 1839 he became professor 
in Kiel. His best known works are on the 
history of modern philosophy and on ethics. 
Champeaux, Guillaume de. A French 
philosopher, died in 1121. He taught 
rhetoric and logic in Paris. Abelard was 
first his pupil, then his rival, and afterwards 
his superior in fame and learning. In 1113 
he became bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne. 
Chance [Lat. cadere, to fall] : Ger. Zufall ; 
Fr. chance, hazard ; Ital. caso accidente. (1) 
An occurrence due to chance is one which 
has no assignable cause, and hence popularly 
supposed to have no cause. Chance itself was 
then hypostatized (the Greek rvxn) as a source 
of uncaused events. 
The theory of absolute chance, or pure 
accidentalism, has been given up—only re¬ 
maining as a metaphysical speculation, called 
Tychism (q. v.), in favour of the following 
meaning, for which the term should be re¬ 
served. 
(2) A chance event is one that can be 
accounted for after it has happened, or pre¬ 
dicted before it happens, by the law of 
Probability (q.v.). The same law provides 
a statement of the degree of probability, 
called ‘ the chance,’ of an event’s happening, 
on the basis of what is already known. Cf. 
Variations. (j.m.b.) 
Change [Lat. cambire, to barter; through 
Fr.] : Ger. Veränderung ; Fr. changement ; 
Ital. cambiamento, mutazione. The occurrence 
of any difference or variation, whether any 
identity is involved or not. A general term 
which includes movement, modification, be¬ 
coming, growth, &c. (r.h.s.) 
The meaning of change (/xeraßoXr), mutatio) 
may be defined under two different heads, 
according as (1) a change is said to have 
occurred, or (2) a thing is said to have under¬ 
gone a change. 
(1) The occurrence of a change denotes 
Cervical Region : see Nervous System. 
Cesare : see Mood (in logic). 
Chain Syllogism : Ger. Schlusskette, 
171